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One line of research on children’s attributions of guilt suggests that 3-year-olds
attribute negative emotion to self-serving victimizers, slightly older children attribute
happiness, and with increasing age, attributions become negative again (i.e., a three-step
model; Yuill et al., 1996, Br. J. Dev. Psychol., 14, 457). Another line of research provides
reason to expect that 3-year-olds may be predisposed to view self-serving moral
transgression as leading to positive emotion; this is a linear developmental model in
which emotion attributions to transgressors become increasingly negative over the
course of childhood (e.g., Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988, Child Dev., 59, 1323).
However, key differences in methodology make it difficult to compare across these
findings. The present study was designed to address this problem. We asked how 3- to
9-year-old children (n = 111) reason about transgression scenarios that involve
satisfying wicked desires (wanting to cause harm and doing so successfully) versusmaterial
desires (wanting an object and getting it successfully via harmful behaviour).
Three-year-old children reasoned differently about desire and emotion across these
two types of transgressions, attributing negative emotion in the case of wicked desires
and positive emotion in the case of material desires. This pattern of emotion attribution
by young children provides new information about how young children process
information about desires and emotions in the moral domain, and it bridges a gap in the
existing literature on this topic.
Preschool-age children know that moral transgressions are wrong (e.g., Smetana, 1981)
and that victims of transgressions feel bad (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Smith, Chen, &
Harris, 2010). However, children younger than 7 often attribute positive feelings to
protagonists who transgress in order to satisfy desires. For example, 4- to 6-year-old
children frequently attribute happiness to characterswhohave obtained things like candy
and toys via stealing or aggression (Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian,
1988; Smith et al., 2010). This phenomenon, termed the happy-victimizer expectancy, is
especially pronounced when young children attribute emotions to third-party transgres-
sors, compared with the self-as-imagined transgressor (Keller, Lourenco, Malti, &
Saalbach, 2003). Across much of the research in this area, there is support for a two-step
developmental progression, with 4- to 6-year-olds attributing happiness to
self-serving transgressors and 8- to 9-year-olds attributing mixed or negative emotions
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(e.g., Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Keller et al., 2003; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988;
though see Murgatroyd & Robinson, 1993).
It has been proposed that when attributing emotion to people who have satisfied
material desires via transgression, children younger than 7 tend to focus on gains and have
difficulty thinking about a victim’s experience as influencing a victimizer’s emotions
(Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006). Older children, on the other hand, are more likely to
simultaneously consider the gains of the transgressor and the transgression itself and are
therefore more likely to predict guilty or mixed emotions in a transgressor (Arsenio &
Kramer, 1992). Young children’s tendency to attribute solely positive emotion may also
be linked to limitations in their cognitive ability to process and attribute two opposing
emotional states (Harris, 1989; Wintre & Vallance, 1994).
There is also empirical support for a model suggesting a 3-step developmental
progression when children are asked to attribute emotion to transgressors who have
satisfied desires. Yuill, Perner, Pearson, Peerbhoy, & van den Ende (1996) interviewed
children as young as 3 about situations in which a person transgressed in order to satisfy a
wicked desire. For example, a protagonist wanted to push a child off a bike and the child
was hurt in the fall. Yuill et al. found that 3-year-olds were prone to viewing transgressors
in thesewicked-desire (WD) scenarios as feeling sad. The5- to 7-year-oldsweremore likely
to attribute positive emotions to the transgressor, and by age 10, children attributed guilt
to the transgressor. Yuill et al. proposed that 3-year-olds view desirability as an objective
property that describes objects and events. Shortly after age 3, the authors suggested that
children come to view desirability as a subjective phenomenon that exists at the meeting
of amind and an object/event (e.g., ‘I don’t like causing harm, but John does’). Thus, Yuill
et al. argued that 3-year-olds view successful transgressors as feeling bad because they
view transgressions and bad intentions as objectively unpleasant.
Two methodological approaches differentiate the Yuill et al. (1996) study from the
related studies cited above: The types of desires studied and the ages of the children
studied. Regarding the issue of desires, we note that Yuill et al. (1996) only used stories
involving wicked desires (WD), while most other studies of the happy-victimizer
expectancy use material-desire (MD) stories in which a protagonist causes harm as a
means to an end (e.g., pushing to get a playground swing).
Regarding the issue of age, we note that the main body of research on the
happy-victimizer expectancy is populated by studies that have presented children ages 4
and older with MD scenarios (e.g., Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Keller et al., 2003; Lagattuta,
2005; Lourenco, 1997; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988; Smith et al., 2010). As noted
above, the key finding from this body of research is that children move, with increasing
age, from anticipating happiness in successful transgressors to anticipating guilt. Only
Yuill et al. (1996) have conducted interviewswith children as young as 3 about situations
in which a person transgressed in order to satisfy a desire.
The discrepancy of age groups and wicked-versus-material desires in the existing
research leads to interpretive problems concerning the development of the happy-vic-
timizer expectancy. For example, Yuill et al.noted that their findings clarified the existing
literature on the happy-victimizer expectancy, overlooking the fact that most existing
studies had focused on the satisfaction of material – not wicked – desires, and had not
included children younger than age 4. Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) did include
both WD and MD stories, but the youngest children tested were 4. These 4-year-olds
attributed positive emotion to transgressors who satisfied both wicked- and material
desires.
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The purpose of this study was to bring methodological consistency to these open
questions about children’s emotion attributions by interviewing children, ranging in age
from 3 to 9, about both WD and MD scenarios.
Each participant saw two successful transgression stories:
1. Material-Desire Success: A transgressor wants a playground swing and pushes
another child in order to successfully obtain it.
2. Wicked-Desire Success: A transgressor wants to push another child on the
playground and does so successfully.
Based upon the twomodels described above, we tested two possible patterns of emotion
attribution as a function of age: Linear and quadratic. We anticipated that a linear model
would best fit the age–attribution association in theMD-success scenario. Young children
begin to verbalize (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Symons, Fossum, & Collins, 2006) and
understand (Rakoczy,Warneken, & Tomasello, 2007; Wellman & Liu, 2004) simple states
of desire well before they explicitly talk about and understand cognitive states such as
thoughts and beliefs. Furthermore, 2-year-olds make use of instrumental aggression to
control desired objects (Hay, Hurst, Waters, & Chadwick, 2011). Thus, we predicted that
3-year-olds would link the use of aggression to happy feelings in the case of MD
satisfaction, as these patterns of desire-related thought and behaviour are relatively age
typical. Consistent with the existing body of work on the happy-victimizer expectancy,
we predicted that the attribution of positive emotion in the MD-success story would
decline in linear fashion with increasing age.
In contrast to our predictions regarding theMD-success scenario, we anticipated that a
quadratic model would best fit the association between age and emotion attributions in
the WD-success scenario. While toddlers and young preschoolers are known to use
aggression to control resources, it is rare tohear a youngchild verbalizing a desire to simply
hurt another person. As noted, Yuill et al. (1996) presented 3-year-olds with fictional
protagonists who simply wanted to hurt others and did so successfully. The 3-year-olds
reacted as if such a desire was objectively bad (or, perhaps, wildly foreign) and expected
the protagonists to feel bad after their wicked desires had been fulfilled.We expected the
same result to emerge in this study, and we also expected to replicate the finding that
children, starting at age 4, would attribute relatively happier emotions in the WD-success
story and that the oldest age group would be most inclined to attribute guilty feelings.
Children were also shown two scenarios in which characters tried but failed to use
aggression to satisfy desires (one MD, the other WD). We were interested in whether
children who attributed negative emotions to successful transgressors would be inclined
to attribute positive emotion (e.g., relief) to a person who tried but failed to transgress.
Method
Participants
Children were recruited and run through the study at Boston-area preschools, summer
camps, and two museum-based laboratory sites. A range of ethnic and socio-economic
backgrounds was represented in the sample, but participants were predominantly White
and from middle-class families.
Participating children (n = 111) included the following: (1) 23 3-year-olds (14 females,
Mage = 3.51, SDage = .27, age range inmonths: 36–46); (2) 45 4- to 5-year-olds (29 females,
Mage = 5.00, SDage = .55, age range in months: 50–71.8); and (3) 43 7- to 9-year-olds (27
females, Mage = 8.43, SDage = .87, age range in months: 84.7–119.9).
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Materials and procedures
Each participantwas interviewed about all four stories. Story character genderwas always
matched to participant gender, and story order was varied using a balanced Latin square
design (see Appendix for text of stories).
A 4-point scale was used to collect emotion attribution data: (1) very sad, (2) a little
sad, (3) a little happy, and (4) very happy. The scale was represented by four faces that
were labelled by the experimenter. During key scenes in the illustrated stories, the
transgressors’ facial features were omitted. Participants were forewarned about this and
were told that this was done because ‘your job is to tell us how the boy/girl feels, and we
don’t want to have a feeling already on his/her face’. None of the children expressed
confusion about the rating scale or the blank faces.
Material-desire stories
The twoMD stories each featured characterswhowanted to obtain an object by pushing a
peer. In all stories, characters’ desires were made salient via the story text, thought
bubbles, and comprehension checks (‘What does Sarah want to do?’). In the MD-success
story, the protagonist (1) wanted a playground swing, (2) pushed another child to get the
swing, and (3)was shownon the swingwhile the victimwas shownon the ground crying.
In theMD-failure story, the protagonist (1)wanted a ball, (2) tried to push another child to
get the ball, and (3) was shownmissing with the push, leaving the other child to continue
playing.
Wicked-desire stories
The twoWD stories each featured characters who wanted to push a peer due to a feeling
of dislike for the peer. In the WD-success story, the protagonist (1) wanted to push
another child, (2) was shown pushing the other child, and (3) was shown standing while
the victim was shown on the ground crying. In the WD-failure story, the protagonist (1)
wanted to push another child, (2) was shown trying to push but missing, and (3) was
shown standing while the intended victim continued playing.
The MD- and WD-success stories were modelled after the Yuill et al. study (1996) in
which victimswere described as hurt and crying. After each story, participantswere asked
the following questions about the main character (a male character is used as an example
here):
1. How does Bill feel at the end of the story? [emotion rating scale used]
2. Why does Bill feel that way? [answer recorded verbatim via paper and pencil]
3. Does Bill have any other feelings? [If ‘yes,’ emotion rating scale used again]
4. [If ‘yes’ to #3]Why does he feel that way? [answer recorded verbatim via paper and
pencil]
Scoring
Emotion attributions
Using the emotion rating scale, all children provided an initial rating in each story. The
main analyses of emotion attributions focused on children’s initial emotion attributions to
the transgressors.
Brief follow-up analyses were also conducted that incorporated children’s responses
to the question about other feelings. For any child who attributed two emotions to a
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character, a blended emotion score for that character was computed as the mean of the
two emotion ratings (e.g., ratings of very happy (4) and a little sad (2) were averaged as
(4 + 2)/2 = 3). This approach allowed us to capture a more nuanced score of how some
children viewed emotions associatedwith transgression.When a child attributed only one
feeling to a character, this was the child’s emotion attribution score for that character.
Mixed-emotion attributions
Children were given credit for attributing mixed emotions to a transgressor only if two
opposite-valence emotions were attributed to a character. The emotion rating scale was
clearly divided by valence, making reliability checks on the scoring of children’s
mixed-emotion attributions unnecessary.
Justifications for emotion attributions
Children’s justifications for their emotion attributions to the transgressors were
categorized using a system similar to those used in related studies (e.g., Arsenio &
Kramer, 1992; Smith et al., 2010). The justifications were categorized as follows:
1. Desires: Responses focused on the desires of the transgressor (satisfied or frustrated).
Examples: She’s happy because she got the ball; He’s sad because he missed the
other boy.
2. Moral Concerns: Responses focused onharm, the act of victimization, ormoral rules.
Examples: He’s sad because he hurt the boy; She’s sad because she know it was
wrong to act that way.
3. Sanctions: Responses focused on being caught or punished. Example: He’s sad
because he’s afraid he’ll get in trouble.
4. Relief: Responses focused – implicitly or explicitly – on happiness that no one was
hurt or victimized (relevant in theMD- andWD-failure stories). Example:He’s happy
because the boy didn’t get hurt.
5. Other: Responses that could not be coded using the categories listed above. Example:
I don’t know.
Two raters separately coded 430 primary emotion attribution justifications using this
system. Inter-rater reliability was high, kappa = .89; the discrepancies were resolved
through discussion. One of the raters then coded the remainder of the primary and
secondary emotion attributions.
Results
Preliminary analyses
All children remembered theprotagonists’ desires in each story at the first comprehension
check. There were no effects of gender or story order; therefore, these variables were not
included in the analyses reported below.
Initial emotion attributions to transgressors
First, children’s initial emotion attributions to the transgressorswere analysed. These data
are displayed inTable 1. As is clear in Table 1, across age groups anddesire types, children
attributed negative emotion to the unsuccessful transgressors. An initial 3 (age
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group) 9 4 (story type: WD-success; MD-success; WD-failure; MD-failure) mixed-mea-
sures ANOVAwith accompanying Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc analyseswas run. These
analyses confirmed three things. First, as a function of age, there were no differences in
how the feelings of the two failed transgressors were viewed (p-values ranged from .71
to 1.00). Second, there were no within-age-group differentiations between the
emotions attributed to the unsuccessful MD and WD transgressors (all
p-values = 1.00). Finally, in most cases, children attributed more positive emotions to
successful transgressors compared with unsuccessful transgressors: 3-year-olds (MD
transgressors p < .001); 4- to 5-year-olds (WD transgressors p < .001; MD transgressors
p < .001); and 7- to 9-year-olds (WD transgressors p = .01; MD transgressors p < .001).
The notable exception to this was consistent with the hypotheses of the study: The
3-year-olds did not attribute significantly different emotions to the successful and
unsuccessful characters with wicked desires, p = .18. Because children’s emotion
attributions to the successful transgressors were most central to the hypotheses of the
study, this is the focus of the remaining analyses of emotion attributions.
A 3 (age group) 9 2 (story type:WD-success vs.MD-success)mixed-measures ANOVA
was run on children’s initial emotion attributions. Mean emotion attributions to the
successful transgressors are displayed in Figure 1. There was amain effect of story type, F
(1, 108) = 12.35,p < .001,g2p = .10. Therewas nomain effect of age group (p = .24), but
there was a significant age group 9 story type interaction, F(2, 108) = 4.00, p = .02,
g2p = .07.
The age group 9 story type interactionwas clarifiedwith simple-effects analyses. As is
evident in Figure 1, the significant interaction was fuelled by the 3-year-old group, which
Table 1. Mean initial emotion attributions (with SDs) to transgressors as a function of age group and
story type
Successful transgression Failed transgression
Wicked desire Material desire Wicked desire Material desire
3 years 2.22 (1.45) 3.22 (1.28) 1.57 (.84) 1.43 (.73)
4–5 years 2.80 (1.25) 2.89 (1.23) 1.51 (.63) 1.53 (.59)
7–9 years 2.35 (1.07) 2.60 (1.12) 1.65 (.57) 1.63 (.62)
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Figure 1. Mean emotion attributions to the successful transgressors as a function of age group and story
type (analysis with initial attribution scores only).
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attributed negative emotion in the WD-success story (M = 2.22) and positive emotion in
theMD-success story (M = 3.22), F(1, 108) = 13.97, p < .001,g2p = .12. Neither the 4- to
5-year-old group [F(1, 108) = .22, p = .64] nor the 8- to 9-year-old group [F(1,
108) = 1.71, p = .19] discriminated between the two successful transgressors in this
manner.
Finally, trend analyses were conducted. The emotions children attributed to the
WD-success transgressorwere, as a function of age group, best represented by a quadratic
model (F for linear trend = .17, p = .68; F for quadratic trend = 4.55, p = .04).
Conversely, the emotions children attributed to the MD-success transgressor were, as a
function of age group, best represented by a linear model (F for linear trend = 3.93,
p = .05; F for quadratic trend = .01, p = .93).
Mixed-emotion attributions
Table 2 displays the frequencies of mixed-emotion attributions. A McNemar test
established that when all participants were considered, there was no difference in the
frequency of attributing mixed emotions in the WD- compared with the MD-success
stories, p = .30. Likewise, there was no difference in the frequency of mixed-emotion
attributions across the WD- and MD-failure stories, p = 1.00. There were, however,
differences across the success and failure stories. Participantsweremore likely to attribute
mixed emotions in the successful transgression stories than theywere in the failure stories
(WD-success vs. WD-failure p = .02; MD-success vs. MD-failure p < .001). As is clear from
Table 2, this effectwas largely driven by the 7- to 9-year-olds. Accordingly,mixed-emotion
attributions were examined as a function of age group.
Low expected cell counts made the use of chi-square tests untenable in analyses that
included all three age groups. A strategy to use two age groups was devised, based on
well-established findings that children younger than 6 years of age frequently deny that
others have mixed feelings (Harris, 1989). The two age groups used in the analyses of
mixed-emotion attributions were 3- to 5-year-olds and 7- to 9-year-olds.
In theWD-success condition, the frequencyofmixed-emotion attributions differed as a
function of age, v2(1, N = 111) = 15.04, p < .001; the 7- to 9-year-olds were more likely
than the 3- to 5-year-olds to attribute mixed feelings to the WD-success transgressor. The
same was true in the MD-success condition, v2(1, N = 111) = 20.95, p < .001, in the
WD-failure condition, v2(1, N = 111) = 9.05, p < .01, and in the MD-failure condition,
v2(1, N = 111) = 4.42, p = .04.
In sum, compared with the failed transgression stories, it was more common for
mixed feelings to be attributed following the successful transgression stories. Further,
the 7- to 9-year-old childrenweremuchmore likely than the younger children to attribute
mixed emotions to the protagonists following each of the four stories.
Table 2. Percentages of participants who provided mixed-emotion attributions as a function of age
group and story type
Successful transgression Failed transgression
Wicked desire (%) Material desire (%) Wicked desire (%) Material desire (%)
3 years 13 4 0 4
4–5 years 11 20 7 7
7–9 years 44 56 23 19
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Following the analysis of children’s mixed-emotion attributions, children’s blended
emotion attributions were briefly explored. For a particular story character, a blended
emotion score was computed as the mean of the primary and secondary emotions
attributed by a child to that character. For a child who attributed only one emotion, this
single rating served at the emotion score for that particular character.
As is evident in Figure 2, the resultswhenusing the blended emotion attributionswere
similar to those reported above. Trend analyses were run on the blended emotion
attribution scores, and the results were the same as above: (1) the emotions children
attributed to the WD-success transgressor were, as a function of age group, best
represented by a quadratic model (F for quadratic trend = 3.46, p = .06) and (2) the
emotions children attributed to the MD-success transgressor were, as a function of age
group, best represented by a linear model (F for linear trend = 5.29, p = .02).
Justifications for emotion attributions
Children’s explanations for their emotion attributions were analysed next. All 111
children provided a verbal response when asked why they attributed a particular primary
emotion in each of the four stories. Thus, there were 444 primary emotion attribution
justifications available for coding. There were 105 secondary emotion attribution
justifications available for coding, resulting in 549 emotion attribution justifications that
required classification.
Very fewof the justifications fell into the relief (3%;n = 19) and sanctions (<1%;n = 2)
categories. By contrast, most were captured by the desires (60%; n = 330) and moral
concerns (23%; n = 129) categories. Roughly 13% (n = 69) of the justifications were not
codable.1 To create a more parsimonious classification system, the relief justifications
were placed in the moral concerns category (concerns about victimization formed the
basis for both types of responses). Because they comprised <1% of the justifications, the
sanctions responses were omitted from further analyses. Thus, the analyses reported
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Figure 2. Mean emotion attributions to the successful transgressors as a function of age group and story
type (analysis performed with blended primary and secondary emotion attributions).
1 In the analysis of justifications for primary emotion attributions, it was found that 64% of all ‘Other’ responses were provided by
children in the 3-year-old group. The large majority of these other justifications by the 3-year-olds involved children saying ‘I don’t
know’. This finding is consistent with other studies in which young children have been able to provide coherent responses without
easily explaining those judgements (e.g., Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier, 2011).
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below focused on children’s moral concerns and desires justifications. In a purely
descriptive approach to the justification data, justifications for emotion attributions were
classified using four categories: (1)mention of desires only; (2)mention ofmoral concerns
only; (3) mention of both desires and moral concerns; and (4) no codable justification
provided. Table 3 displays the frequencies of these justification types as a function of age
and story type.
To resolve problemswith lowcell counts, (1) only codable justifications (listed asD,M,
andD/M in Table 3)were subjected to formal analysis and (2) justifications that contained
any references to moral concerns (M and D/M in Table 3) were combined into one
category and were compared to desires-only justifications.
In theMD- andWD-failure conditions, the largemajority of codable justifications – 84%
and 91%, respectively – focused solely on frustrated desires. A McNemar test established
that children did not differ in the extent to which they used desires-only justifications
across theWD- andMD-failure conditions (p = .21). Further, the age groups did not differ
in the extent to which they offered desires-only justifications in both the WD-failure
condition, v2(2, N = 88) = 1.16, p = .56, and in the MD-failure condition, v2(2,
N = 98) = 3.39, p = .18. Finally, a series of McNemar tests established that children
offered significantlymore desires-only justifications in response to the failed transgression
scenarios comparedwith the successful transgression scenarios (all p-values < .001). The
remaining justification analyses focus on the WD- and MD-success stories.
There was a significant association between age and justification type in the
WD-success scenario, v2(2,N = 100) = 11.62, p < .01. More of the 7- to 9-year-olds (85%)
mentioned moral concerns in the WD-success scenario compared with the 3-year-olds
[53%; v2(1, N = 56) = 6.32, p = .01] and the 4- to 5-year-olds [52%; v2(1,
N = 85) = 10.72, p < .001]. The two younger groups did not differ, p = .94.
A similar association between age group and justification type emerged in the
MD-success scenario, v2(2, N = 106) = 17.27, p < .001. More of the 7- to 9-year-olds
(77%) mentioned moral concerns in the MD-success scenario compared with the
3-year-olds [22%; v2(1, N = 61) = 15.81, p < .001] and the 4- to 5-year-olds [47%; v2(1,
N = 88) = 8.39, p < .01]. The two younger groups did not differ, p = .07.
In sum, children of all ages focused on frustrated desires in the MD- and WD-failure
stories. As expected, in the MD- and WD-success stories, the 7- to 9-year-old group was
most likely to think about the transgressors’ emotional responses in moral terms.
Table 3. Frequencies of justifications for emotion attributions as a function of age group and story type
(expressed as percentages)
3 years (%) 4–5 years (%) 7–9 years (%)
D M D/M O D M D/M O D M D/M O
WD-S 30 30 4 35 47 40 11 2 14 32 49 5
MD-S 61 13 4 22 53 27 20 0 23 19 58 0
WD-F 39 4 0 57 76 7 4 13 72 2 16 9
MD-F 65 0 0 35 89 0 7 4 79 0 14 7
Note. Story types abbreviated as: WD-S = wicked-desire success, MD-S = material-desire success,
WD-F = wicked-desire failure,MD-F = material-desire failure. Justifications abbreviated as:D = desires
only, M = moral concerns only, D/M = both desires and moral concerns mentioned, O = other
(uncodable). Percentages were computed with the sanctions category omitted from analyses.
Percentages are rounded to nearest whole number.
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Although the 3-year-olds saw theWD-success transgressor as feeling bad, they were often
unable to explain their attributions of negative emotion. By contrast, the 3-year-oldswere,
by and large, able to explicitly connect theMD-success transgressor’s positive emotions to
satisfied desires.
Discussion
There are timeswhenpeople commitmoral violations to gain control of a valued resource,
and there are other cases in which people commit moral violations solely in the service of
inflicting physical or emotional pain (Baumeister, 1996). The goal of the present studywas
to ascertain how 3- to 9-year-old children expect others to feel after satisfying these two
types of desires.
Our results show that 3-year-olds reason quite differently about the satisfaction of
material-versus-wicked desires. Three-year-olds predicted that positive emotions would
stem from material-desire satisfaction, and this tendency declined in linear fashion
through age 9. This is consistent with the 2-step model described in the bulk of the
happy-victimizer literature (e.g., Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Nunner-Winkler & Sodian,
1988).When asked to predict the emotions that stem fromwicked-desire satisfaction, the
youngest and oldest children tended to attribute the most negative emotions, while the
middle group (4- to 5-year-olds) was more inclined to attribute positive emotions. This is
consistent with the inverted-U-shaped model described by Yuill et al. (1996). Thus, the
present study provides a useful bridge across two sets of previously disconnected
findings.
Why might 3-year-olds in particular differentiate between the two types of transgres-
sion when attributing emotion? We argue that children in this age group are inclined to
focus tightly, in objective fashion, on the ultimate target of the desire. With this view of
desires, in theWD-success scenario, a personwants and ends upwith a problematic result
(e.g., the hurting of a peer). In the MD-success case, a successful transgressor may cause
harm, but attention is tightly focused on the fact that the transgressor wanted and ended
up with something good.
One factor contributing to 3-year-olds’ conceptions of wicked desires as objectively
unpleasant may be the challenge of representing diverse mental states. Three-year-olds
can easily graspmaterial desires; wanting an attractive object is a familiar desire for young
children and young children are known to use aggression to control resources (Hay et al.,
2011). However, 3-year-olds may not grasp that a person can harbour the desire to simply
harm others; this is not a desire commonly expressed by young children. In response to a
WD-success story, 3-year-olds may attribute negative emotion because the transgressor is
experiencing a mental state that simply seems wrong or foreign.
Recent research on children’s understanding of diverse desires complicates this
account somewhat. Rakoczy et al. (2007) found that 3-year-olds appropriately attributed
emotion to themselves and others in a task in which the child’s own desire was mutually
incompatible with someone else desire and only one party’s desire was satisfied.
However, while 3-year-olds have the capacity to accurately impute emotions to people
whose desires conflict with their own, we argue that this feat is easier in some situations
than in others. In the Rakoczy et al. (2007) study, the desires in question fell squarely
within the personal domain (Nucci, 1981), where preferences and behaviours do not
cause harmor injustice to others (as in themoral domain), injury to the self (the prudential
domain), or disruptions to the flow of social life (the social–conventional domain;
Smetana, 2006). The current study featured desires that resided in the moral domain.
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Young children appear to have difficulty grasping diverse desires in this particular
domain, where children think in terms of rigid rights and wrongs (e.g., Nucci & Turiel,
1993). Indeed, Wainryb and Ford (1998) showed that 5-year-olds have difficulty stating
another person’s unusual moral belief – a teacher’s view that sharing unfairly was
acceptable – even after the children were informed of the teacher’s belief. Similarly,
Conry-Murray (in press) found that 4-year-olds who had passed standard false-belief tasks
had difficulty repeating the belief held by a teacher that biting others is okay. While Yuill
et al. (1996) did find that 5-year-olds link happy feelings to the satisfaction of wicked
desires when personal interests are made more salient than moral concerns, more
research is needed to explore links between children’s attributions of emotion and their
ability to represent others’ unusual moral beliefs.
Another factor that deserves attention in future research is the extent to which
children’s positivity biases and their capacity to represent others’ wicked desires are
related phenomena. Research on the positivity bias has shown that preschool-age
children need several pieces of negative information about another person before they
view that person in a negative light (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). Similarly, 3- to 7-year-old
children more readily make use of positive testimony about a new person, compared
with negative testimony (Boseovski, 2011). It may be that especially for the youngest
children in the present study, the information provided in the WD-success scenario was
not rich enough to convince them that the WD-success character truly wanted to be
aggressive.
Finally, the absence of contextual information in the present study may have masked
many of the youngest children’s insights into wicked desires. There is evidence that
children are willing to predict antisocial action in the context of revenge (e.g., Posada &
Wainryb, 2008). Future studies should explore children’s understanding of transgression
and emotion when issues like revenge are introduced.
Wenote that children in the present study also saw characters attempting but failing to
transgress. Most children attributed negative emotion in these cases. Even children who
saw theWD-success transgressor as feeling bad predicted that theWD-failure transgressor
would also feel bad. Failure to satisfy a desire of any typemay cue an automatic attribution
of negative emotion. This finding adds, in nuanced fashion, to related research. Lagattuta
(2005) found that with increasing age, children becomemore likely to attribute pride to a
character whowants transgress but exerts willpower to avoid a transgression attempt. By
contrast, the present study showed characters actively attempting to transgress but
failing. Given this, it is possible that older childrenmay be especially likely to differentiate
situations in which a person wants to transgress and fails versus situations in which a
person wants to transgress and refrains.
Conclusion
We found that 3-year-old children attribute negative emotion to a person who satisfies a
wicked desire to victimize others and positive emotion to a person who victimizes others
to fulfil a material desire. These results bridge a number of existing studies on the
development of emotion understanding in the moral realm (e.g., Nunner-Winkler &
Sodian, 1988; Yuill et al., 1996) and paint a more complete picture of how very young
children represent the relationship between desire and emotion. Our findings highlight
the need to consider multiple aspects of context (e.g., target of desires, nature of social
domain) when characterizing the development of mental-state understanding.
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Appendix: Full Text of Stories (Girls’ Version Presented Here)
MD-success story
(1) Sarah is on the playground at school. She sees that a girl in a yellow shirt iswalking over
to use the swing. (2) Sarah really wants to get on the swing. (3) Sarah pushes the girl in
yellow. (4) The girl in yellow falls down and hurts her arm and cries and Sarah gets the
swing.
WD-success story
(1) Kim is at school. She sees a girl in a blue shirt. Kim does not like the girl in blue. (2) Kim
reallywants to push the girl in blue andmakeher fall down. (3)Kimpushes the girl in blue.
(4) The girl in blue falls down and hurts her leg and cries.
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MD-failure story
(1) Emily is at school. She sees a girl in a red shirt playingwith a ball. (2) Emily really wants
to playwith that ball. (3) Emily tries to push the girl in red and take the ball, but shemisses.
(4) And the girl in red just keeps playing with the ball.
WD-failure story
(1) Lara is at school. She sees a girl in a green shirt. Lara does not like the girl in green. (2)
Lara reallywants to push the girl in green andmake her fall down. (3) Lara tries to push the
girl in green, but she misses. (4) And the girl in green just keeps playing.
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